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Abstract 
The present article proceeds from the mainstream view that the conceptual framework 
underpinning adversarial systems of criminal adjudication, i.e. a mixture of common-sense 
philosophy and probabilistic analysis, is unsustainable. In order to provide fact-finders with an 
operable structure of justification, we need to turn to epistemology once again. The article 
proceeds in three parts. First, I examine the structural features of justification and how various 
theories have attempted to overcome Agrippa’s trilemma. Second, I put Inferential 
Contextualism to the test and show that a defeasible structure of justification allocating epistemic 
rights and duties to all participants of an inquiry manages to dissolve the problem of scepticism. 
Third, I show that our epistemic practice already embodies a contextualist mechanism. Our 
problem was not that our Standard of Proof is inoperable but that it was not adequately 
conceptualized. Contextualism provides the framework to articulate the abovementioned 
practice and to treat ‘reasonable doubts’ as a mechanism which we can now describe in detail. 
The seemingly insurmountable problem with our efforts to define the concept “reasonable 
doubts” was the fact that we have been conflating the surface features of this mechanism and its 
internal structure, i.e. the rules for its use. 
 
Keywords: set of epistemic defeaters; context-relevant doubts; reasons for decisions;  
inferential contextualism; criminal evidence; scepticism; applied epistemology 
1. Law and Epistemology 
1.1. Introduction 
The intricacy of the standard claim that a discipline is as good as its foundations critically 
surfaces at the intersection between law of evidence and analysis thereof. The debate on the 
theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of legal evidence especially criminal evidence 
seems stalled and plagued by fundamental paradoxes (Redmayne 2008). For one thing, the 
epistemological framework underlying the criminal process, i.e. common sense philosophy 
cannot deliver what it promises especially in our increasingly complex world: valid inferential 
relations between the evidence and the verdict (Kotsoglou 2015). Unreasoned decisions based 
on inarticulate common sense inferences, which conceive the fact-finder as a black box, are 
paradigmatic cases of arbitrary decision-making. Utilizing inner sensations (e.g. ‘feeling sure’ 
or ‘beyond reasonable doubt’) is an open invitation to self-deception, for they lack public criteria 
of correctness. For another, the Standard Model in the law of evidence, which measures 
persuasion along a scale between 0 and 1, alternatively: between 0 and 100 (Redmayne 1999), 
and requires a degree of belief just over .5 in civil cases and of just over .95 in criminal ones, 
faces two possibly insurmountable problems.  
First, aleatory probabilities quantify uncertainty in an axiomatized way, albeit involve 
repetitive and replicable processes. We simply cannot run parallel controlled trials to test the 
guilt of the defendant, for litigation deals, Evidence scholars indefatigably remind us, that legal 
adjudication deals with unreplicable situations (Dennis 2017: 142). There is simply no universe 
of randomly selected defendants in which we could count the number of times that the defendant 
is the culprit and the number of times where the opposite is the case. From Aristotle who 
observed that it is “foolish to [...] demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs” (Aristotle, Nic. 
Ethics, i3, 1094b) to modern forensic scientists who are at pains to stress that the idea “of a 
frequency being attached to an outcome for a single event is ridiculous” (Lucy 2006: 5), scholars 
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have continuously rejected (bogus) claims of generality when it comes to legal decisions. 
Therefore, the Standard Model does not discharge the task of establishing repetitiveness and 
replicability of the pertinent events as a condition for assigning a non-negative real number Nn ϵ 
R to an object On (persuasion). The idea of a standard of proof (SoP) as a numerical threshold 
for deciding issues of disputed fact is deeply flawed. 
Secondly, the level of proof is supposed to depend on the “particular type of adjudication”.1 
For that reason, the Standard Model claims, we need to identify what is at stake in each type of 
adjudication. As opposed to a civil case, in which the risk of wrongful decision is symmetrically 
allocated between the parties, the necessity of minimizing the risk of wrongful conviction in 
criminal adjudication engineers a steeply asymmetrical SoP. This arrangement premises on a 
categorical distinction between civil and criminal adjudication. This would presuppose that, for 
example, every instantiation of the – according to an estimate – ca. 9,000 offences in the criminal 
law of England and Wales – which range from the quotidian (inconvenience offences) to the 
momentous (murder and rape) – have graver consequences than, say, any Court of Protection’s 
decision on the withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment. A criminal conviction carries usually 
graver consequences than a civil verdict. However, this is an empirical claim as it involves 
utilities which can hardly be verified. E.g. the decision of a Court of Protection to withdraw or 
withhold life-sustaining treatment has in many regards graver consequences than almost any 
decision made by a criminal court. It becomes obvious that the whole discussion was tailored to 
capital crimes since being sentenced to death is more serious than any other legal consequence. 
However, now that the death penalty has been abolished in most countries, this distinction has 
lost its intuitive appeal. The Standard Model cannot provide a good explanation for the 
assessment of utilities for each type of adjudication. 
This paper argues that it is possible to piece together a coherent picture of our epistemic 
practice and procedural devices. My aspiration is not only to settle an academic debate but also 
to give a theoretically sophisticated account of the procedural formula proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt (BRD), whose structure is open to scrutiny and which is based on communicable rules. 
The seemingly insurmountable problem with our efforts to define ‘reasonable doubts’ or ‘feeling 
sure’ was the fact that we have been conflating the surface features of our main procedural device 
(SoP) and its internal structure, i.e. the rules for its use. Having focused on the former for 
centuries has urged us to move around in circles by providing nothing but paraphrasing. We need 
to understand the process, i.e. the structure of justification that facilitates a microscopic analysis 
of the particular factual inferences for a warranted knowledge claim such as ‘the defendant is 
guilty’ Unless we provide fact-finders with logico-grammatical rules, governing the use of 
‘feeling sure’ or its synonym ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’, and fix the semantics of these 
words by providing a structure of justification, certainty will remain an elusive concept which 
obeys no criteria of correctness. 
This still leaves key questions unresolved. Who will be the heir to the throne? In order to 
replace an epistemology, we need much more than a promising theoretical framework. A system 
of criminal adjudication reaching stalemate is not a viable option for any realistic theory of 
criminal evidence. The reconceptualization of basic evidentiary concepts as proof, justification 
and knowledge has to take place during business-as-usual operation. The article proceeds in three 
parts. First, I examine the structural features of justification and how various theories have 
attempted to overcome Agrippa’s trilemma (Section 2). Second, I put Inferential Contextualism 
to the test and show that a defeasible structure of justification allocating epistemic rights and 
duties to all participants in an inquiry manages to dissolve the problem of scepticism (Section 
3.). Third, I discuss the surprising insight that our epistemic practices in criminal litigation 
already embody a contextualist mechanism (section 4). This realization raises deep 
philosophical questions about the primacy of theoretical or practical reason, the general role of 
philosophy and the direction of cross-disciplinary research. Answering these questions in depth 
reaches far beyond the scope of the present paper (cf. section 4.1). Our main problem is not the 
inoperability of the SoP but its inadequate conceptualization. Inferential Contextualism provides 
the framework to articulate an already existing practice and to treat the procedural device of 
reasonable doubts as the label of a functioning procedural mechanism that we can now describe 
in detail. Providing the conceptual framework for live procedural devices would doubtless be 
the maximum that cross-disciplinary research may offer. 
                                           
1 In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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1.2. Turn to Epistemology 
Now, the question is: what could provide us with the theoretical framework and rationalize a 
ubiquitous feature of our epistemic activity by regulating the drawing of conclusions? The 
answer, which – I think – is rather simple: epistemology, threatens to nip things in the bud. 
Evidence scholars who go theoretical on doctrinal issues risk the suspicion of pedantry. Lawyers 
simply switch off as soon as they encounter sophisticated epistemological concepts (Roberts 
2007: 42). This would be, however, a hasty, indeed wrong, reaction – for three reasons. 
(a) Legal History  Legal history reveals the unsustainability and superficiality of any 
legalistic and methodologically autistic approach. E.g. it is well documented that, when the law 
of evidence, which emerged in the eighteenth century, did not grow in vacuum (Shapiro 1991). 
Historical research unequivocally shows that legal scholars incorporated the epistemological 
vocabulary of widespread concepts in moral, theological and philosophical literature, and made 
“a considerable effort [...] to place the English Law of Evidence [...] on a more sound 
epistemological foundation” (Shapiro, 1991: 223). Integral parts of our law of evidence were 
thus derived from other disciplines which, for various reasons, had been more innovative. 
(b) Autonomy of law The adoption of an epistemologically elevated perspective has 
been traditionally branded as a deviation from the orthodoxy of a purely doctrinal approach, 
often attributed to the fin de siècle American legal scholar James B. Thayer (cf. Roberts 2011). 
According to this view, the subject of evidence has to remain coextensive with the law of 
evidence – at all costs. Notwithstanding the criticism against philosophical or mathematical 
applications to law, this argument falls, I think, short of the mark. Admittedly, Thayer has 
unequivocally propagated a dichotomy, more accurately a trichotomy: between law, fact and the 
reasoning process. As Thayer memorably remarked, law and facts are one thing, and “the process 
by which conclusions are reached; namely the process of reasoning” is another (Thayer 1898: 
195). However, one thing Thayer makes clear, is that reasoning processes are ubiquitous. First, 
he defines the Law of Evidence as a “set of rules and principles affecting judicial investigations 
into questions of fact” (Thayer 1898: 263). And the more the law develops, Thayer remarks, or 
the more “new situations and complications of fact arise”, the more we need to give “definiteness 
to its phraseology” (Thayer 1898: 189-90). This warrants the conclusion that conducting in-depth 
inquiries into fact-finding, especially the analytical techniques that facilitate warranted factual 
inferences are of vital importance. And here comes the crucial point in Thayer’s line of thought: 
He makes clear that “the process of reasoning has a place, and that is everywhere.” (Thayer 1898: 
278). Therefore, we neither abandon the realm of law and the doctrinal (legal) perspective by 
dealing with the process of reasoning – nor do we grant prerogative powers in exchange for 
theoretically elevated concepts. On the contrary, we deepen our understanding or even gain fresh 
insight into the way our fundamental evidentiary concepts and procedural devices operate. For 
the field of evidence “refers tacitly” to epistemological considerations (Thayer 1898: 265). 
(c) Economy of thought  As we saw above, in times of intellectual crisis evidence 
scholars turn to neighbouring disciplines. This is not because epistemologists supposedly have 
the prerogative of interpretation over concepts underlying evidential matters, but mainly because 
there are good chances for their concepts to be more progressive than ours. By doing so, we 
simultaneously follow a methodological rule, i.e. the economy of thought. In the same way that 
we simply do not design and build an operative flying machine in order to travel, we do not have 
to become philosophers in order to acquire an understanding about basic evidentiary concepts. 
2. Law and Scepticism 
2.1. Criminal Adjudication. A Search for Truth? 
According to the dominant view in evidence scholarship, criminal adjudication is primarily a 
system rendering “accurate decisions” (Duff/Farmer/Marshall/Tadros, 2007). In the same way 
that an accurate diagnosis identifies those who require treatment, an accurate verdict at a 
criminal trial identifies those who merit punishment. Intertwined with the idea of justice is 
therefore the idea of truth, since the criminal trial has a duty to ascertain the latter. The centrality 
of truth in legal enquiries is manifested in various ways. A few examples may serve to illustrate 
this point. The jury has to take an oath by some deity or affirm that they will give a true verdict 
according to the evidence. The law, e.g. in England and Wales, provides explicitly that one of 
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the goals of fact-finders is to form justified true beliefs. Rule 1.1.(a) of the Criminal Procedure 
Rules (CrimPR) ends with a two-part mandate:   
 
1. Convict the guilty. 
  2. Acquit the innocent. 
 
Justice thus seems to co-vary with the correspondence between the truth-value of the verdict 
on the one hand and the real facts on the other hand.2 The legal system assesses the epistemic 
performance of fact-finders on the basis of ‘truth’ qua condition of forensic knowledge. For a 
decision to be true, we need, according to the mainstream view, to render a verdict whose 
propositional content p corresponds with reality. However, we can meaningfully instruct the 
fact-finders to acquit the law-abiding citizens and to convict the perpetrators and thus render a 
true verdict, if (and only if) we abandon the uncertainty-laden space of reasons and assume the 
standpoint of an omniscient observer who has privileged access to any information. This is an 
unrealistic scenario, featuring an impersonal, third-person narrator who supposedly has access 
to the “real facts”. Rendering a verdict is not like writing a novel or seeing the world from a 
god’s eye perspective. A rugby manager who gives the instruction ‘In order to win, you need to 
score more tries than the other side’ is barely saying anything meaningful (cf. Williams 1995: 
239). Having true beliefs and avoiding false ones is undoubtedly a legitimate aspiration. 
Evidence theory and the respective SoP must, however, be much more than a set of overarching 
goals. They have to include an instruction sheet. The two-part mandate mentioned above is 
meaningless in any epistemic context, until and unless someone explains how these (legitimate) 
goals can be achieved. By treating terms like truth or error as non-epistemic (external) standards 
of correctness and not as the result of an (analytic) reasoning process, we abandon the fact-
finders’ epistemic point of view. 
So how can we establish the truthfulness of the outcome of criminal adjudication? We need 
an informed view, not on our goals – the goal of factual rectitude is assumed in modern legal 
systems – but on the inferential microstructures yielding justified verdicts which will in turn 
warrant the respective overriding goals. In order to assume an external, material perspective – 
which will allow us to read criminal verdicts against the so-called real facts – we would need, as 
Williams pithily puts it, “a hot line to Nature’s mysteries” (Williams 1995: 239). The absence 
thereof forces us, however, to make judgements based solely on the evidential features of a given 
justificatory structure. In other words:  
Reaching factual conclusions that fit well with the admissible evidence and the respective 
SoP is the way of rendering verdicts that can be regarded as true, not the other way around. 
We measure truth by the ways we are epistemologically entitled to raise warranted knowledge 
claims, not by its correspondence with some cognitively unapproachable objective reality. Truth 
cannot be discovered, found or sworn. It is, if anything, a propositional function. What we need 
is a conceptual framework that puts emphasis on the procedurally structured process of 
knowledge-claim validation, i.e. a theory of justification that informs us on the scaffolding of 
fact-finder’s epistemic activity, not a theory of truth. 
 
2.2. Back to uncertainty 
In the previous section we saw that the standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief is 
in many regards doing injustice to practical inquiries like legal or scientific contexts. Epistemic 
justification is the standard of truth. In criminal adjudication, the SoP is – for very good reasons 
– the exclusion of reasonable doubts, not objective truth. 
Quite naturally, we have to turn our focus to the structure of our knowledge-claim validation 
processes, i.e. the structure of epistemic justification. The problem of epistemic justification – 
for many the “most central of all” (Bonjour 1988: XI) – examines the structure of reasoning 
patterns rendering a warranted / justified belief based on evidence. But the moment we begin 
with this inquiry, we are confronted with an alarming situation, which is central for the 
discussion of distinguishing adequately justified beliefs (i.e. warranted knowledge claims) from 
mere opinions. In order to understand this problem, we only need to assume that someone – call 
him the claimant (hereinafter: Cl.) – brings forward a knowledge claim (p). Then we need 
                                           
2 See Tehan v. U.S., 383 U.S. 406, at 416 (1966) where the U.S. Supreme Court states unequivocally that the 
“basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth”. 
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someone else – call him the challenger (hereinafter: Ch.) – who will simply ask how Cl. came to 
believe that p is the case. And every time Cl. brings new evidence (en+1) into the discussion to 
back his initial statement, a new challenge is being issued, spearheaded as a simple question 
‘How do you know?’. We can depict this discussion, known as Agrippa’s Trilemma (AT) (Striker 
2004), as follows: 
 
p ← ei ← ei-1 ← ei-2 ← ei-3 ← ... ← ei-n 
(structure 1.1.) 
 
Three options (NAT) emerge for Cl.: 
 
1AT. Cl. can always keep trying to bring new evidence into the discussion, i.e. embark on an 
infinite regress: 
 
p ← ei ← ei-1 ← ei-2 ← ei-3 ← ... ← ei-∞ 
(structure 1.2.) 
 
2AT. Cl. can flatly refuse to go on infinitely. He will then at some point make a dogmatic, i.e. 
unjustified assumption (UA) which is not backed by any reasons: 
 
p ← ei ← ei-1 ← ei-2 ← ei-3 ← ... ← UA 
(structure 1.3.) 
 
3AT. Cl. can reiterate an argument he has already used, i.e. opt for a circular loop and bring 
the same piece of evidence (in this case: e2) into the discussion more than once: 
p ← e1 ← e2 ← e3 ← e4 ← ... ← e2 
(structure 1.4.) 
 
At this very moment, the question (‘How do you know?’) reveals its destructive force. A 
seemingly innocent question triggers a worrisome conclusion. The task of providing a general 
account of justification ends in failure and thus in scepticism. It seems that we are not entitled to 
raise any knowledge claim since we cannot back our propositions with adequate evidence. We 
qua finite beings cannot let the chain of justification run away to infinity. Both other options are 
unacceptable from an epistemological point of view, too. Neither can we arbitrarily terminate 
the chain of reasoning, nor can a proposition serve as both a conclusion and a justifying premise 
by being brought forward as a reason twice. The conclusion that no empirical claim is ever 
justified relies, seemingly, on our own concept of justification – not on a far-fetched sceptical 
claim. Claimants (epistemic agents) have no epistemic rights insofar as they cannot adequately 
justify any belief. As a result, we have to at least temporarily suspend judgement. 
Both main theories of epistemic justification, i.e. foundationalism (section 2.3.) and 
coherentism (section 2.4.), are trying to attack this conclusion head-on and to show that we can 
construct a structure of justification rendering knowledge claims capable of justification. 
 
2.3. Foundationalism 
Foundationalist theories of justification aspire to identify classes of beliefs that can bring a chain 
of reasoning (see structure 1.1) to an epistemologically sustainable halt. The common 
denominator among them is the so-called twofold thesis, according to which a class of beliefs 
possess an immediate, intrinsic epistemic status of justification. It is intrinsic because it does not 
depend inferentially on the epistemic justification of other empirical beliefs. And it is immediate 
because empirical beliefs of this sort are taken to be self-explanatory. These basic beliefs (F) are 
regarded as the “ultimate source of justification for all of empirical knowledge” and have thus 
the capacity of terminating (otherwise infinite) chains of justification (Bonjour 1985: 15). By 
postulating a certain kind of epistemically privileged beliefs, which are intrinsically credible, we 
generate a structural asymmetry for the architecture of knowledge (Audi 1998: 49). While basic 
beliefs bring justification to an ultimate end, non-basic ones – i.e. the second class of empirical 
beliefs – belong to the super-structure and derive their justification from the former through 
“justification-transmitting inferential connections” (Williams 1995: 82). In that sense, an 
individual belief is according to epistemological foundationalism, justified if (and only if) its 
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pedigree leads directly or via more inferential steps to the privileged class of basic beliefs. In the 
history of epistemology, plenty of candidates for F have been defended: experience, immediate 
awareness, brute-sense impressions, e.g. visual or auditory appearances, protocol sentences, or 
observation terms are only a few examples. All these candidates presuppose that basic beliefs 
are not dogmatic and can terminate the chain of justification in an acceptable way. In other 
words, foundationalists cast doubt on the middle horn (structure 1.3) of the Agrippa’s Trilemma: 
p ← ei ← ei-1 ← ei-2 ← ei-3 ← ... ← F 
(structure 1.5) 
 
Foundationalism in Law  The idea that some categories of beliefs are basic and have 
an intrinsic epistemological status is not strange to legal reasoning or practice. An example will 
suffice to illustrate this point. In a controversial case, the U.S. Supreme Court has invoked brute-
sense impressions to justify its decision, thus assuming that a video footage combined with 
properly functioning sensory systems on behalf of the viewers could effectively terminate the 
chain of justification.3 The Court used a videotape capturing the events in question, as the judges 
– in a rare, nonfigurative instantiation of the legal principle res ipsa loquitur – were “happy to 
allow the videotape to speak for itself”.4 So they uploaded a URL for a digital rendering of the 
videotape to the Court’s website, thus creating the Court’s first (and to the best of my knowledge: 
only) “multimedia cyber-opinion” (Kahan et al. 2009). 
Both arguments premise on self-justifying beliefs, which can (a) be meaningfully used or (b) 
terminate a chain of justification – and can thus be read in the light of a foundationalist tenet: 
bringing justification to an absolute stopping point is grounded in the fact that the content of 
these beliefs has been directly apprehended through the video footage or the applicant’s mere 
presence in the court room. For these beliefs possess a warrant which does not depend on the 
justification of other empirical beliefs. The fact-finder is released from his epistemic duty to 
establish an evidential link between premises and conclusions of arguments, since the evidence 
in question is self-explanatory. Basic beliefs excuse the fact-finder from charges regarding lack 
of accountability. 
 
2.3.1. Foundationalism and the Myth of the Given 
The idea of basic beliefs as something indubitable or “given” has considerable intuitive 
plausibility. Observational knowledge is apparently grounded in our direct experience of the 
world and self-evident propositions such as ‘the colour of this object is red’ or generally in things 
we see and hear inside and outside the court room – things that are justified non-inferentially. 
Although I cannot even hint at the many criticisms against foundationalism, I will focus in this 
section on the argument with the most destructive power: the criticism against the “Myth of the 
Given” (Sellars 1963). We saw above that epistemological foundationalism has certain 
implications for the architecture of knowledge. In that sense, there must be some kind of 
connections / logical relations between basic and superstructure beliefs, which are inferentially 
based on the former. Sellars contended that the idea of foundational beliefs as something given 
to one’s consciousness meets insurmountable problems. Undeniably, the ‘world out there’ 
causes our perception thereof. But causal relations do not suffice to provide the inferential 
relations between our beliefs and the external world (Sellars 1963: 127). If we want epistemic 
justification to be transferred from one belief to another via inferential connections, we need 
some form of compatibility between basic and superstructure beliefs. Chains of justification 
involve epistemic relations rather than blind causality (Williams 1995: 168).  
Foundationalist theories are subject to criticism, for they have to explain how observations 
are in no need of justification but can at the same time stand in logical relations to e.g. the belief 
‘In the videotape, I see such and such things’. Either the phenomenon has no propositional 
content – i.e. has not been conceptually articulated and is for the same reason incompatible with 
other articulated beliefs – or the same appearance has been conceptually articulated but is also 
in need of further justification. Both outcomes of this dilemma are fatal for foundationalist 
theories. To the same conclusion came three psychologists who took up the ‘see-for-yourself’ 
challenge set by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case discussed above. In an empirical research, 
they showed the video footage to identifiable groups of citizens and concluded that while a 
                                           
3 See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (2007). 
4 Id. at 1775 (majority opinion); Cf. Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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“fairly substantial majority did interpret the facts the way the Court did”, people with different 
ethnical or ideological backgrounds had formed a competing factual perception. The invocation 
of brute-sense impressions to justify a decision, Kahan et al. argued, has nothing to do with the 
question asked by the Court. The question is not whether to believe one’s eyes, but rather “whose 
eyes the law should believe” (Kahan et al. 2009: 841). Justice Scalia was right in being confident 
that the videotape “speaks for itself”. Yet, the answer to the question of what the video had said 
varies with the person the video is talking to. Treating sense data as a regress stopper results in 
cognitive illiberalism since one assumes that other people could not possibly perceive the 
pertinent data on the videotape differently (Robertson/Vignaux 1993). The idea of self-justified 
beliefs as an Archimedean point resembles the idea of perpetual motion which produces work 
without the input of energy. Epistemic justification has to be earned by giving reasons, just as 
energy has to be produced. The criticism against foundationalist theories of justification made 
increasingly clear that even observational knowledge of e.g. simple objects or colours bring our 
whole conceptual and inferential machinery into play (Caruso et al.: 2009). 
 
2.4. Coherentism 
The second candidate attempting to tackle Agrippa’s Trilemma are holistic theories of 
justification placing internal consistency (coherence) at the heart of epistemic activity. 
Coherentists deny that it is the content of an individual belief – i.e. whether it is a basic or 
superstructure belief – that determines its epistemic status. Accordingly, a belief is justified if 
(and only if) it coheres with a set of other beliefs, in other words: if (and only if) a belief is part 
of a system of beliefs which hangs together (Bonjour 1985: 93). Unsurprisingly, the design of 
coherentist theories of justification has major implications for the architecture of knowledge, 
which now has to be imagined as a network rather than a pyramid. The predicate ‘justified’ can 
thus only be attributed to a set of coherent beliefs. Coherence is predominantly a feature of the 
whole system rather than of an individual belief. Every belief contributes to the consistency of 
the system and can only be conceived as part of it. As Neurath (1959: 201) memorably put it, 
“we are like sailors who must rebuild their ship upon the open sea, never able to  
dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct there out of the best materials.” 
Obviously, this results in radical holism. In terms of Agrippa’s Trilemma: coherentism implies 
that circularity (structure 1.4) is after all not such a bad idea. For it allows an inference from e1 
to e2, then from e2 to e3, and then from e3 to e1, which is unavoidable in a network of 
interconnections: 
 
 
(structure 1.6) 
 
Explanationism Coherence theories are neither new nor unknown to legal scholars – 
especially evidence theorists. In fact, story-telling occupies centre stage in the literature on fact-
determination. Similar ideas – propelled by the increasing interest amongst psychologists (e.g. 
Hastie/Pennington 1986) in the reasoning patterns employed by fact-finders – have been put 
forward by a number of scholars who defend a narrative account of juridical proof (Amaya 
2015). Ronald J. Allen has in a series of articles constructed the “relative plausibility theory” 
and purports to understand juridical proof as “a form of inference to the best explanation” (Allen, 
1994). Of course, Allen realizes that the term ‘plausible’ does not make things easier. He explains 
that “[w]hat is ‘plausible’ is a function of the explanation, its coherence, consistency, coverage, 
consilience, and how it fits into the background knowledge possessed by the fact-finder” (Allen 
2008: 325). This has, obviously, implications for what can and should count as (relevant) 
evidence: Evidence is relevant, Allen remarks, “if it fits into an explanatory account” (Allen 
2008: 327). 
Both coherence and narrative theories have been backed by empirical research showing that 
human beings do employ narratives (story-telling) when making judgements under uncertainty 
– and that as a matter of fact, fact-finders choose between the plausibility / coherence of the 
stories involved in the legal process. Notwithstanding the fact that empirical results about story-
e2
e3
e1
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telling do not map onto normative aspects of any theory of evidence, the coherentist theories of 
justification face at least two insurmountable problems. 
Isolation  The first line of attack questions whether coherence theories have any 
connection to reality, i.e. whether they are truth-conducive. If justification – so the argument 
goes – is to be regarded as an exclusively system-internal matter, then there is no way to 
differentiate between “arbitrary fairy stories” and an “historical report” (Schlick 1959: 216). 
Remember that coherence is a system-internal relation, for justification premises on a set of 
individual beliefs that relate to one another. Coherence theories of justification make it possible 
for the mutually exclusive hypotheses ‘Earth is flat’ and ‘Earth is round’ to be equally justified. 
This argument is referred to as the isolation objection and applies smoothly to the narrative 
approach, too. If the “critical insight of the relative plausibility theory” (Allen/Leiter 2001: 1528) 
is that fact-finders determine the relative plausibility of the competing stories advanced by the 
parties and the only criterion for relevance is how well it integrates into an explanatory account, 
then narrative approaches jettison their veritistic character. Theories or stories in court which 
can be classified into the “best-fitting verdict category” (Amaya 2015: 102) literally do not come 
to grips with reality. Propositions like ‘The earth is flat’ or ‘The Germans didn’t commit the 
Holocaust’ can be – if surrounded by an appropriate, perfectly coherent set of beliefs – deemed 
equally plausible / coherent as the opposite propositions, i.e. ‘The earth is round’ or ‘The 
Germans executed six million Jews’. As Bonjour remarked – after he had repudiated his own 
coherentist theory – we are unable to choose between an infinite number of equally coherent 
systems of beliefs in an “epistemically non-arbitrary way” (Bonjour 1985: 25). 
Computability The second objection highlights the fact that by allowing inferential 
connections between all atomic propositions, in order to create a net of beliefs, we trade 
coherence for epistemic paralysis (Cherniak 1984: 53). As Allen himself remarks, a typical 
judicial context involves a “rich, highly complex set of interdependent pieces of evidence” (Allen 
1997: 258). No algorithm or human has the capacity to ‘do the math’ by analyzing even a modest 
system of beliefs consisting of 100 propositions. The process becomes instantly computationally 
intractable, for the cataloguing of the combinatorial possibilities of all these elements would 
strain even a super-computer. In attempting to solve the problem of scepticism and adequate 
justification, we are yet again walking blindfold into another problem. 
3. A Diagnosis of Scepticism 
3.1. Epistemological Contextualism 
Both theories (section 2.3. and 2.4.) that constitute the heart of epistemologists’ efforts to tackle 
scepticism take the sceptical challenge at face value by trying to construct a sceptic-resistant 
theory of knowledge. Therefore, they are regarded as direct responses to scepticism (Williams 
1995: 146). So now disaster threatens since these efforts end up in failure. Epistemological 
contextualism, a term which has become a shorthand name for a growing movement in 
epistemology, signifies a rather different, indirect approach to the problem of scepticism. The 
present study cannot examine all kinds thereof (see Kotsoglou 2015). The problem is not just the 
great diversity of contextualist theories, but mainly the fact that “epistemological contextualism” 
is a collective label for two distinct families of theories (Baumann 2005: 229): Semantic 
Contextualism (SC) and Inferential Contextualism (IC). These two groups not only have a 
different theory design but rather tackle different problems, since SC offers a therapeutic 
diagnosis of scepticism (see section 3.1.1.) whereas IC offers a theoretical one (see section 3.2. 
and 3.4.). 
 
3.1.1. Semantic Contextualism 
Proponents of SC maintain that the verb ‘to know’ is context-sensitive in the sense that sentences 
of the form ‘S knows that p…’ will express different propositions and thus have different truth 
values, depending on their context of utterance (see e.g. Cohen 1987: 3). The main tenet of SC 
is the semantic doctrine according to which epistemological key terms such as ‘to know’ behave 
like an indexical, the semantics of which involve degrees or scales. They further claim that the 
problem of scepticism is just a misunderstanding that is based on linguistic confusion. Paradoxes 
arise because we fail to notice the indexical character of the expression ‘to know’. However, SC 
is subject to criticism for two main reasons: 
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First, we have no linguistic evidence for the gradeability of knowledge claims. While SC 
suggests that the word ‘to know’ behaves somewhat similar to adjectives like ‘tall’ and ‘flat’, 
knowledge ascriptions are apparently not gradable. Expressions such as ‘the witness very knows 
that the suspect committed the crime’ or ‘witness A1 knows better than witness A2 that the suspect 
committed the crime’ strike us as particularly odd (Stanley 2004: 125-142).  
Second, SC presupposes the continuity of the epistemic spectrum of error possibilities. 
According to SC, a change in context consists of either raising or lowering the epistemic 
standards. And whenever sceptical scenarios (i.e. even far-fetched error possibilities) are made 
explicit to the conversational context, we raise the epistemic standards to the maximum. As a 
result, we are forced to conclude that everyday knowledge is somewhat less significant and 
inferior than philosophical knowledge. How could we resist choosing more austere epistemic 
standards for our most important affairs in life once we come to realize that the philosophical 
context is at the more demanding end of the spectrum? For this would mean among other things 
that a fact-finder in a criminal trial who questions the existence of the world at the time of the 
alleged crime would be replacing laxer by stricter standards of scrutiny. What is more, scepticism 
about knowledge cascades down the justification scale and infiltrates even normal or scientific 
knowledge claims, for the set of admissible doubts (error possibilities) at the upper end of the 
scale becomes unrestricted. The effort to compartmentalize knowledge and to contain scepticism 
in the philosophical context – where error possibilities are unlimited – is not convincing. 
 
3.2. The Prior Grounding Requirement 
Proponents of IC deny that scepticism results from a misunderstanding. After all, we do 
understand the sceptical challenge. IC’s target is to identify its theoretical commitments and to 
show that there is something very peculiar about our obligation to back up any belief. That is the 
essence of the proffered theoretical diagnosis of the problem of scepticism (Williams 1995: 253). 
One of the most striking elements of the Agrippan problem is the fact that, as we saw above, 
the Ch. can meaningfully raise the question ‘How do you know?’ no matter how well-informed 
or well-prepared the Cl. is. In fact, the whole destructive force of the Agrippan problem is 
spearheaded by this simple question. Put simply, even if a belief (p) is “in accordance with the 
best methods then developed for discovery and testing in a scientific domain” (Annis, 1978: 
215), the Ch. is still entitled to put ‘p’ into doubt. Let us depict the structure of this conversation 
(Table 1.1): 
 
 
We realize that, as soon as we respond to Agrippa’s challenge, the sceptic is bound to win. As 
the cardinality of the set of admissible naked challenges becomes unrestricted, we allow the 
philosophical sceptic to take verification to its extreme. The Cl. will inevitably reach the point 
where he does not know how to answer any more and can only stamp his feet, insisting on the 
rectitude of evidence. It seems that the language game into which the Ch. invites us has a 
scepticism bias. 
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A central feature of the abovementioned structure of justification is the fact that all 
justificatory burdens are placed exclusively on the Cl. The same feature distracts us from the fact 
that the sceptic has absolutely no epistemic duties. Is this, however, a natural state of things? The 
blueprint of this language game is by no means unconditioned or imposed by the “nature of 
epistemic justification” (Williams 1995: 170). The steeply asymmetric allocation of epistemic 
duties and rights is not a self-explanatory state of things in the same way that absolute monarchy 
is not a natural form of government. The language game is thus loaded. The unrestricted 
entitlement that relieves the respective Ch. from all epistemic duties outlines at the same time 
the theoretical commitment of the Agrippan sceptic. The set of rules and theoretical 
commitments described above is a highly theorized conception of justification, which we are by 
no means bound to accept without contradiction. The unconditional authorization to issue naked 
challenges is known as the Prior Grounding Requirement (PGR) (Williams, 1995: 150). 
According to the PGR, by entering a claim or evidence for a belief, we automatically trigger a 
naked challenge, i.e. the question ‘How do you know?’. Once entered, challenges deprive 
knowledge claims of their justificatory status. 
 
3.3. On Certainty 
The language game described above is not just counterintuitive but runs against well-sustained 
epistemic practice. At least among adults, all epistemic activity is a two-way street. The question 
‘How do you know?’ becomes at some point insofar void of meaning, as it is not accompanied 
by an explanation of the reasons necessitating an answer. The Ch. can reiterate the same question 
infinitely, whereas the Cl. can never take on a relaxed attitude. This is a striking asymmetry. 
Authorization to challenge a belief should – for anyone with pretensions to epistemic 
responsibility – also be earned. Arguing that e.g. some experiment results may change on their 
own or that the accused may have an unknown twin brother when there is absolutely no reason 
to believe so, does not engineer higher epistemic standards; it implies a lack of understanding 
about the direction of the inquiry (Wittgenstein 1969). 
Wittgenstein, who provided us with the blueprint of pragmatist epistemology and IC, argues 
that doubts have to be grounded too, if they are to be meaningful. He explicitly uses real, down-
to-earth epistemic inquiries such as a criminal trial and stresses that these inquiries are based on 
some certainties which cannot be asserted or doubted in the same context. These doubts would 
not be “reasonable” (Wittgenstein 1969: para 8, 335). The element that gave thrust to 
Wittgenstein’s epistemological thought was the belief that our epistemic practices are deeply 
rooted in our practical needs, not in philosophical reflections. He points out that “[i]n the 
beginning was the deed” (Wittgenstein 1969: para 402), thus parting ways with philosophical 
orthodoxy and the primacy of theoretical reason, which is detached from all practical constraints. 
Doubts are not destructive weapons but useful tools in a language game consisting of a complex 
set of practices such as adducing and examining evidence in order to reach a decision. 
Epistemic practices (and their essential element: doubts) are designed to “bring an open 
question to resolution”, not to perpetuate discussion or render any knowledge claim impossible 
(Stroll, 1994: 146). Doubting presupposes normative structures and certain propositions which 
are exempt from doubt. These methodological constraints do not forestall critical thought, but 
on the contrary enable it. Without non-doubting, there is no doubting either –at least in 
Wittgenstein’s view. The latter exists only if the former does, too. That is not a manifestation of 
unreflective hastiness or epistemic dysfunction, he adds. “[I]t is part of judging” (Wittgenstein 
1969: para 150). The foundations of an epistemic inquiry, i.e. certainties (C) are indubitable not 
qua necessarily true propositions but qua methodological hinges enabling directed questioning. 
E.g. trial judges in common law jurisdictions routinely step in and remove particular issues from 
adversarial dispute by formally ‘noticing’ them. Certainties operate as rules, enabling us to treat 
other propositions as true or false. Graphically speaking: 
p ← ei ← ei-1 ← ei-2 ← ei-3 ← ... ← C 
(structure 1.6) 
 
Meaningful, directed doubting which advances knowledge and serves practical needs 
presupposes indubitable propositions – that is the main message of “On Certainty”. Ceaseless 
questioning introducing doubts about everything at once transgresses the bound of (legitimate) 
doubt: “A doubt without an end is not even a doubt.” (Wittgenstein 1969: para 311-315). Without 
reasonable grounds for doubt, one cannot begin the game of doubting as questions like the ones 
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set right above lack a procedure of closure. They do not make sense because they do not “come 
to an end somewhere” (Wittgenstein 1969: para 625). These illegitimate questions are an 
instantiation of a behaviour that only vaguely resembles doubt-behaviour. They are detached 
from real life, for they cripple “our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game” 
(Wittgenstein 1969: para 204). Sceptical quasi-doubts cannot undermine our knowledge as they 
will at some point cross the threshold into unintelligibility. They stand outside our practical 
inquiries. 
Pointing at the need to base doubting or specific grounds, we once again realize that 
scepticism is underpinned by theoretical commitments (PGR) which are not self-evident; indeed, 
they are deeply problematic, and we gain the right to challenge the latter. By rejecting the PGR, 
we achieve that a) the sceptic loses the right to challenge everything without providing grounds 
and b) we pave the way for a fair allocation of epistemic rights and duties of Cl. and Ch. In order 
to call into question a belief or the claimant’s entitlement to hold it, we need more than a naked 
challenge. Required is the instantiation of a real doubt. A challenger has to explain what exactly 
he has in mind. We can represent this in the following way (Table 1.2):  
 
 
 
Williams calls this justificatory structure the Default and Challenge (DaC) strategy (Williams 
1995: 152). According to DaC, the claimant is entitled to a belief p, if the latter is backed up by 
reasons (en), unless the Ch. introduces specific reasons (epistemic defeaters) that prove the 
opposite or challenge the correctness of p. It becomes apparent that one of the distinctive features 
of DaC is that it assigns justificatory duties to all participants of an epistemic inquiry. The Ch. 
no longer has the unconditional authorization to issue naked challenges. This simple move, i.e. 
the slight modification in the epistemic engine of the language game, “stops the regress in its 
tracks” (Williams 1995: 151). As Fogelin puts it, the challenge of Pyrrhonian scepticism is once 
accepted “unanswerable” (Fogelin 1994: 119). We have very good reasons not to accept the 
challenge. 
 
3.4. Inferential Contextualism 
The central feature of IC is the insight that the rules of an epistemic inquiry are not self-justifying 
epistemological entities but norms and standards that we set, reject or modify. Standards for 
correctly attributing or claiming knowledge are not fixed once and for all, i.e. they are not 
universal, but subject to circumstantial variation (Williams 1995: 159). For example, the 
question whether some sort of error possibilities is admissible for a certain category of crime – 
is not answerable to the alleged eternal nature of justification but rather subject to “actual social 
practices” (Annis 1978: 215). A variety of epistemic norms, practices and rules will determine 
the inferential structure of an inquiry – i.e. which propositions will remain indubitable, which 
ones will enjoy a default status, and which epistemic defeaters will gain membership to the set 
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of epistemic defeaters (SED) in play. SED denotes the set of legitimate doubts that can be 
introduced as a defeasible structure into the respective language game (Kotsoglou 2015): 
 
SED = {D1, D2, D3, ... Dn} 
(structure 1.7) 
 
Herein lies IC’s most distinctive feature, which also makes it very appealing for practical 
purposes. The raising and lowering of standards of proof does not consist in the raising and 
lowering of the alleged degree of probability – this has proven to be deeply problematic – but in 
the variable cardinality of the SED. The SED contracts and expands according to a number of 
contextual parameters salient in the respective inquiry. By introducing a new error possibility, 
we issue a defeater and raise the standards for claiming or attributing knowledge – and vice 
versa. The standard of proof is heightened or lowered as the cardinality of the SED, i.e. the heart 
of the epistemic mechanism, changes. 
 
3.5. The contextual parameters 
IC’s theoretical toolkit includes contextual factors which will in turn determine the cardinality 
of the SED. Generally, certain propositions need to be exempt from doubt if we need to raise 
meaningful questions at all. Uncertainty about the proposition ‘2 + 2 = 4’ does not make us more 
diligent or stringent (outside a seminar on Peano arithmetics). It shows that we do not understand 
numbers. Some propositions serve as hinges (C) which do not condemn us to foundationalism 
but rather make it possible to conduct meaningful and targeted research. For example, it would 
be impossible to conduct an experiment and at the same time raise questions about the efficiency 
or even the very existence of the apparatus (intelligibility constraints) or the underlying statistical 
framework (methodological constraints). A jury can apply more or less strict standards of proof. 
But in a criminal trial, one could claim only on the pain of irrationality that “someone came into 
the world without parents” (Wittgenstein 1969: para 335). A palaeontologist who feels forced to 
prove that the planet has been in existence for longer than 4,000 years is not simply raising the 
level of scrutiny. He is changing the subject by ignoring dialectical constraints of this specific 
inquiry (Fogelin 1994: 93). As James Gleick reminds us: “If all scientists had to begin from the 
beginning, questioning fundamental assumptions, they would be hard-pressed to reach the level 
of technical sophistication necessary to do useful work” (Gleick 1997: 36). 
Furthermore, we can have variation even among the generally acceptable error possibilities 
in a certain inquiry. A cost-benefit analysis based on the values at play steps in. For example, we 
(annoyingly) accept many false-positive fire alarms at our workplace because we recognize the 
value of human life and property. And we realize that minimizing the risk of an undetected fire 
necessitates an inversely proportional risk of false alarms. Viewed in the light of IC, if the stakes 
are high, more severe epistemic standards are in order. Spending millions of tax payers’ money 
in order to find a missing child is common practice, whereas a few minutes are enough for a 
stolen bicycle, even if in both cases there is no line of inquiry. In other words: the cardinality of 
the SED, i.e. the severity of our epistemic standards, also depends on economic parameters and 
the utilities of the probandum. All factors described above concern the personal dimension of 
epistemic justification. Another parameter purports to connect personal justification with the 
“well-groundedness” (reasonableness) of a belief by adding an externalist element (Williams 
1995: 162). At the end, it is the community view of what reasonable means that allows us to 
assess the adequacy of an epistemic performance. 
Let us take stock: if important values are at stake and the costs of an error are high, the SED 
has to expand: we impose austere standards of justification. What is good enough in one 
epistemic context is barely sufficient in a different one. Our limited time and resources as well 
as the need for a finality of decisions necessitate the abovementioned economic considerations. 
For example, a criminal process is neither a ritual nor an open-ended historical inquiry (see Art. 
6(1) ECHR). A legal system will treat things valued as benefits and things to be avoided as costs. 
It will then adjust the reasonable epistemic standards accordingly. 
4. Applied Epistemology or Theorized Practice? 
4.1. Applications 
Academic papers sitting between law of evidence and epistemology traditionally proceed from 
the abstract to the concrete, i.e. from the conceptual framework to the respective applications 
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thereof. So how would IC (re)shape our epistemic practice? We are back at the point where the 
whole discussion starts: the SoP in criminal adjudication and the question about which standard 
is set by the procedural device ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’. 
IC brings about in my opinion the Saul effect where scales fall from our eyes. We can now 
‘see’ that our epistemic practice – what we routinely do – is at the same time a robust normative 
theory of justification. Criminal courts across common-law jurisdictions have routinely stressed 
that only substantial – as opposed to fanciful (sceptical) – doubts can prevent a conviction.5 In 
his seminal ‘Webster charge’, Judge Shaw instructed the jury that reasonable doubt “is not mere 
possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs [...] is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt”.6 Evidence scholars have also repeatedly remarked that probative value is 
“highly contextual, depending on the facts of individual prosecutions” (Roberts/Zuckerman 
2010: 446). IC can now provide an adequate description of the dynamics of this mechanism 
enabling contextual variation (cf. Ho 2008). This does not mean that IC and my justification 
model is just a correspondent reflection of the world and of what actually happens. The added 
value is that we employ an epistemological vocabulary to articulate our main procedural device. 
We can now analyse – and not just vaguely describe – what criminal courts actually do in their 
daily business. The question of whether this is applied epistemology or theorized practice loses 
thus its importance. Articulating our epistemic practice enables us to refine and adapt it more 
efficiently to our procedural aspirations. 
So our epistemic practices and inquiries already embody mechanisms that raise or lower the 
standards for attributing knowledge by contracting or expanding the semantics of ‘reasonable 
doubt’. The model does not just spill out easily into our epistemic practice but conceptualizes in 
a more accurate way the rules underlying that practice. It provides us with the right – in Kuhn’s 
terms: “metaphor” – which enables us to “see” things more clearly (Kuhn 1996: 196). In the 
same sense, the model is the conceptual framework for an epistemic practice hitherto visible to 
us only through its surface features, i.e. the predicate ‘reasonable doubts’ whose content may 
have posed the biggest riddle in the law of evidence. But ‘reasonable’, as any other concept, is 
not a thing; it has no essence to reveal. It has semantics whose rule-governed use we can now 
adequately describe through the conceptual apparatus of the SED. 
After all, the BRD standard which can now be read as a proof beyond context-relevant doubt 
standard (structure 1.7) did not result from a theoretical discussion in the 19th century. It emerged 
dynamically as an epistemic practice and became widely accepted as the SoP in criminal 
adjudication. It is thus the necessity and our way of acting that lies at the foundation of our 
thinking 
“Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; -but the end is not certain 
propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game.” (Wittgenstein 1969: para 204). 
The concept “reasonable” suggests the shadow of something still deeper; not impenetrable or 
mystical but inadequately conceptualized. As Moyal-Sharrock (2004: 205) explains, experience 
void of concepts is “only intellectually blind, not inoperable”. Despite the absence of a 
conceptual framework, the system of (criminal) adjudication acquired the institutional know-
how in order to resolve social conflicts – efficiently and intelligibly. By extensively employing 
the doctrinal device of ‘reasonable’ – the law is overly reliant thereupon – legal systems have 
managed to find their way about. This adaptive, “fluid principle”7 allows us to accommodate an 
infinite number of cases. Our failure to provide a definition of ‘reasonable’ resulted from the fact 
that ‘reasonable doubt’ is actually the framework, not the target system. We cannot define the 
toolkit. We use it to render a decision. For so long, we have confused the explanans (reasonable 
/ context-relevant) with the explanandum (particular case). The seemingly insurmountable 
problem with our efforts to define it, was the fact that we have been conflating the surface 
features of our main procedural device and its internal structure, i.e. the rules for its use. Focusing 
on the former has urged us to move around in circles by providing nothing but linguistic 
refinements. We need to analyse instead the structure of justification that facilitates a 
microscopic analysis of the particular factual inferences required for a warranted knowledge 
claim such as ‘The defendant is guilty’. 
                                           
5 See e.g. State v. Dauphinee, 121 Pa. Super. 565, at 590 (1936). 
6 Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (Mass. 1850). 
7 Bourhill v. Young [1943] AC 92 (per Lord Wright). 
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According to the justification model proffered here, the SoP is not a function of the degree of 
probability, but of the cardinality of the SED which expands or contracts. The same proposition 
(e.g. getting wet) may be irrelevant in one context but becomes relevant in a different one where 
e.g. a new-born baby should at all costs remain dry – so that we need to rule out the possibility 
of rain. The element that shifts from context to context is not the grade of probability – the 
probability of sunshine remains the same in both cases. It is the new defeater which has now 
been introduced to the SED due to the (increased) importance of the probandum – and vice versa. 
‘Reasonable’ is simply the visible top of an iceberg of epistemic practices, sharing the same 
structure, i.e. the contraction and expansion of the SED. By conceptualizing our epistemic 
practice in the context of contested criminal proceedings, we do not provide a static solution to 
an allegedly intractable equation, i.e. the meaning of reasonable, but describe, instead, a dynamic 
process: an adaptive structure of justification. Reasonableness is not asserted when an accurate 
definition is given but when a certain kind of epistemic behaviour is followed. IC provides us 
with justificatory patterns by projecting onto the world the epistemological vocabulary through 
which we can deliver a full-blown theory of legal evidence. This theory can facilitate an 
indefinite recontextualization of proof in criminal adjudication triggered by social change. But 
this has to do with a surface feature (open texture) of a context-sensitive concept, not with the 
stability of our procedural devices. 
Most importantly, my model does not interfere with the internal operations of the respective 
legal order since its normative structure can smoothly incorporate any values. Its structure is 
perfectly compatible with frameworks where decisions are made under uncertainty. Truth is a 
surface feature of warranted beliefs, not vice versa. The model explicitly allows for non-
epistemic factors to be considered, economic or otherwise. Last but not least, the model is 
compatible with decisions whose propositional content contradicts each other. What has to be 
regarded as adequately justified in a given inferential content is not good enough in a more 
demanding context. 
 
4.2. SED versus Standard Model 
The pivot on which epistemic agents swing is the SED and not the scale of numerical 
probabilities vis-à-vis grades of belief. This runs counter to the Standard Model in the law of 
evidence whose central feature is the concept of (aleatory) probability. The epistemic practice 
that produced aberrations (incl. paradoxes) from the point of view of the Standard Model 
produces consistency from the perspective of a contracting and expanding SED. Fact-finders do 
not calculate probabilities. Their task is to assign the terms reasonable / context-relevant to 
various doubt-claims and error possibilities which, accordingly, do or do not gain membership 
to the SED. My model has, I think, far more explanatory power with regard to our epistemic 
practice. 
5. Final Remarks 
We turned to epistemology for an elevated understanding of epistemology and evidence. The 
main question a theory of evidence has to answer is at which point the process of knowledge 
claim validation can come to an end. The SED is more complex than a rigid and rather naive 
epistemic (numerical or otherwise) threshold for each type of adjudication. Crucial is the 
question of which error possibilities (doubts) will gain membership to the SED. With regard to 
the allegedly appropriate cardinality of the SED, my model remains silent. It offers only a 
structural analysis of the SoP. Each legal system can embed its own values and determine what 
counts as loss/gain. What is more, these considerations are not external to the justificatory 
framework but part and parcel of the underlying structure. 
Chief Judge Newman suggested in his Madison Lecture that we should “move beyond” the 
reasonable doubt standard, not by replacing it but by doing more than merely verbalizing it in 
jury instructions (Newman 1993: 990). The present paper moves, I think, in this direction. The 
question about the nature of the inquiry (applied epistemology or theorized practice?) is deep 
albeit irrelevant, for no theory per se could interfere with or invalidate the internal structure of a 
valid and functional legal order. Lacking the theoretical vocabulary for an epistemic practice 
does not render the latter unworthy or invalid. However, articulating what we already do, will 
enable us to refine our practices and instruct fact-finders about what they should do, in a more 
efficient and comprehensible way. 
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